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Intended and unintended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption:  
A review of extant evidence and suggestions for future research 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper discusses empirical evidence on the economic consequences of manda-
tory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the European Union 
(EU) and provides suggestions on how future research can add to our understanding of these 
effects. Based on the explicitly stated objectives of the EU‟s so-called „IAS Regulation‟, we 
distinguish between intended and unintended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Empirical research on the intended consequences generally fails to document an increase in 
the comparability or transparency of financial statements. In contrast, there is rich and almost 
unanimous evidence of positive effects on capital markets and at the macroeconomic level. 
We argue that certain research design issues are likely to contribute to this apparent mismatch 
in findings and we suggest areas for future research to address it. The literature investigating 
unintended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption is still in its infancy. However, extant 
empirical evidence and insights from non-IFRS settings suggest that mandatory IFRS adop-
tion has the potential to materially affect contractual outcomes. We conclude that both the 
intended and the unintended consequences deserve further scrutiny to assess the costs and 
benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption, which may help provide a basis for evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the IAS Regulation. We provide specific guidance for future research in this 
field. 
Keywords: International accounting, IFRS adoption, economic consequences, contracting, 
regulation, review 
JEL Classification: G38, K12, K22, K34, M41, M48
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Intended and unintended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption: 
A review of extant evidence and suggestions for future research 
1. Introduction 
EU Regulation No. 1606/2002 (the IAS Regulation) requires firms listed in the European 
Union (EU) to prepare their consolidated accounts according to International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS) from fiscal year 2005 onwards. The IAS Regulation is intended to 
help ensure a high degree of transparency and comparability of financial statements in order 
to improve the efficient functioning of the EU capital market (EC 2002). This paper summa-
rizes and discusses extant empirical literature on the economic consequences of this manda-
tory IFRS adoption. It also provides suggestions for future research interested in understand-
ing the impact of harmonizing financial reporting standards around the world. 
Following Zeff (1978) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) we use the term economic 
consequences to denote any effects of financial reporting on firm values and on the wealth of 
those who make (or are affected by) decisions based on accounting information. We define 
economic consequences to be intended (unintended) if they can (cannot) be reconciled with 
the IAS Regulation‟s explicitly stated objectives. These objectives emphasize capital-market 
as well as macroeconomic effects resulting from enhanced transparency and cross-country 
comparability of financial reporting. However, they do not explicitly refer to the impact of 
financial reporting on contractual relationships. This regulatory focus arguably owes to the 
supranational character EU law, which exploits information externalities across jurisdictions 
but cannot accommodate other, country-specific roles of financial statement information. Our 
distinction between intended and unintended consequences therefore relates to the distinction 
between the information (or valuation) and contracting (or stewardship) roles of accounting.1 
We document that the rich empirical literature on the intended consequences of mandatory 
IFRS adoption generally fails to find an increase in the comparability or transparency of fi-
nancial statements. In contrast, evidence of positive effects in capital markets and at the mac-
roeconomic level is plentiful and almost unanimous. Since these latter effects are assumed to 
stem from IFRS adoption rendering financial statements more comparable and/or transparent, 
                                                          
1  By referring to the (potentially positive) contracting effects of mandatory IFRS adoption as „unintended‟ 
consequences, we do not intend to attach a negative connotation to the contracting role of financial reporting. 
This choice of terminology exclusively reflects the fact that an explicit reference to contracting conse-
quences is absent from the IAS Regulation‟s stated objectives. Likewise, no normative connotation is at-
tached to our relating what we call „intended‟ consequences to financial reporting‟s information (or valua-
tion) role.  
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these two sets of findings appear to be at odds. We offer two potential, non-mutually exclu-
sive explanations for this conflict. First, extant literature tends to understate the accounting 
effects of mandatory IFRS adoption because it applies aggregate measures that capture only a 
subset of potential changes in financial reporting. Second, empirical studies could overstate 
the capital-market and macroeconomic effects of mandatory IFRS adoption because they are 
difficult to separate from the effects of concurrent changes unrelated to financial reporting. In 
addition to this identification problem, we show that extant evidence on the capital-market 
effects of mandatory IFRS adoption relies on commercial databases that suffer from a bias 
towards large firms. If large firms are more likely to benefit from IFRS (see, e.g., Christensen 
et al., 2007), this bias helps explain the documented positive IFRS adoption effects.  
Finally, we caution that capital-market outcomes may be consistent with both intended and 
unintended consequences. For example, stock market reactions to IFRS reconciliations can 
reflect either value-relevant information for shareholders (Horton and Serafeim, 2010) or 
wealth transfers between lenders and shareholders (Christensen et al. 2009). The latter study 
suggests that IFRS adoption has material effects on contractual outcomes, which is in line 
with insights from non-IFRS settings indicate that mandatory IFRS adoption potentially trig-
gers unintended wealth transfers due to its influence on contracts such as compensation 
schemes or lending agreements. We expect the literature on unintended consequences to 
grow as researchers explore accounting‟s stewardship function in the IFRS adoption context. 
This paper makes the following contributions to the accounting literature. First, we com-
plement previous review articles on the economic consequences of financial reporting. 
Whereas prior papers either discuss the costs and benefits of financial reporting regulation in 
general (e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; Bushman and Landsman, 2010) or are confined to 
early (e.g., Hail and Leuz, 2007; Hail et al., 2010) or selected (Pope and McLeay, 2011) evi-
dence on the intended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, our study provides a com-
prehensive review of the current literature by introducing the useful dichotomy of intended 
versus unintended consequences. Furthermore, our paper complements an earlier review of 
the voluntary IFRS adoption literature (Soderstrom and Sun 2007). Whereas studies related to 
voluntary IFRS adoption provide conflicting evidence within the same categories of eco-
nomic consequences (accounting effects, capital market effects), we find that the mandatory 
IFRS literature is similar within but inconsistent across categories. These different insights 
are likely due to research design issues idiosyncratic to each literature (e.g., self-selection at 
the firm-level is the less of an issue when studying reactions to mandatory changes). 
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Second, our analysis suggests that both intended and unintended consequences merit fur-
ther scrutiny to establish a balanced view on the overall impact of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Therefore, we provide suggestions for future research on two levels. One the one hand, im-
proved research designs should enable stronger inferences about intended consequences. For 
example, progress is likely to come from disclosure, accounting choice and compliance stud-
ies using hand-collected data, as well as from studying smaller firms. On the other hand, the 
under-researched unintended consequences are a fruitful area for future inquiry. Interesting 
insights will likely stem from exploiting expert accounting knowledge to identify useful set-
tings and from using actual contract data or, where absent, appropriate proxies. 
Third, our study contributes to the international debate on whether harmonizing account-
ing standards is effective in achieving regulatory objectives. As such, it provides a potential 
source for assessing the effectiveness of the IAS Regulation. We base our analysis on the 
explicitly stated objectives of the IAS Regulation in order to evaluate research on this specific 
regulation rather than critique the regulator. Since these goals are consistent with the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board‟s (IASB) objectives and since the objectives of manda-
tory IFRS adoption are similar around the world (e.g., AGFRC 2002), we also draw on litera-
ture from other settings in case EU evidence is absent. Our discussion is therefore relevant 
beyond the EU and hopefully proves useful for both researchers and regulators. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details on the institu-
tional background and develops our distinction between intended and unintended economic 
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. Section 3 is a review and critique of extant evi-
dence on the intended consequences. In section 4, we provide suggestions for future research 
on the intended and unintended consequences. Section 5 concludes by summarizing our find-
ings and discussing the caveats to our analysis. 
2. Institutional and conceptual background 
2.1. The IAS Regulation and its objectives 
After several decades of financial reporting harmonization, the European Commission in-
troduced IFRS in 2002 (for details, see e.g. Pope and McLeay, 2011). Regulation (EC) No 
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of 
international accounting standards (EC 2002), the so-called IAS Regulation, expresses its 
pursued objectives as follows (EC 2002, Art. 1): 
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“This Regulation has as its objective the adoption and use of international ac-
counting standards in the Community with a view to harmonising the financial in-
formation presented by the companies ... in order to ensure a high degree of 
transparency and comparability of financial statements and hence an efficient 
functioning of the Community capital market and of the Internal Market.” 
Similarly, the then European Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services stated 
(McCreevy, 2005): 
”As users become more familiar and confident with IFRS, the cost of capital for 
companies using IFRS should fall. It should lead to more efficient capital alloca-
tion and greater cross-border investment, thereby promoting growth and employ-
ment in Europe.” 
The following assumed causal chain emerges from these stated objectives:2 The European 
regulator expects the harmonizing effect of mandatory IFRS adoption to increase the trans-
parency and comparability of European financial reporting, allowing equity and debt markets 
to function more efficiently. This effect lowers firms‟ cost of capital, improves capital alloca-
tion, and fosters cross-border investment, which in turn translates into positive effects at the 
macroeconomic level (e.g., increased growth and employment). We thus note two financial 
reporting objectives (transparency and comparability), one overarching capital market objec-
tive (efficient functioning), and two macroeconomic objectives (growth and employment). 
They form a causal chain with unspecified transmission mechanisms.3 
These objectives are not unique to the EU regulator. Not only are they underscored by the 
IASB as well;4 they are also consistent with the objectives stated by regulators implementing 
IFRS in other jurisdictions. For example, the Australian Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
“fully supports the Government‟s view that a single set of high quality accounting standards 
                                                          
2  The IAS Regulation mandates IFRS adoption only in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded 
entities, whereas member states have an option to permit or require IFRS adoption elsewhere. Sellhorn and 
Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006) report considerable heterogeneity in the implementation of this option across 
member states, with only few countries allowing IFRS to fully replace national GAAP systems. For exam-
ple, while German private firms are allowed, but not required, to prepare their consolidated accounts under 
IFRS, the legal-entity financial statements, on which capital maintenance regulation is based for all German 
corporations, must still be prepared under German GAAP. 
3  Consistent with these expectations, some empirical studies find evidence of positive (negative) capital-
market reactions to events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU 
(Comprix et al., 2003; Christensen et al., 2007; Armstrong et al., 2010).  
4  The IASB‟s objectives are delineated in its Preface to IFRS, including: “to develop … a single set of high 
quality … financial reporting standards [that] … require high quality, transparent and comparable informa-
tion in … financial reporting to help investors, other participants in the various capital markets of the world 
and other users of financial information make economic decisions” (IFRSF 2010b, para. 6 (a)). 
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… will greatly facilitate cross-border comparisons by investors, reduce the cost of capital, 
and assist Australian companies wishing to raise capital or list overseas” (AGFRC 2002). 
With respect to the enforcement of IFRS, the IAS Regulation established a coordinating 
and supervisory role for the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).5 CESR‟s 
Standard No. 1 (March 2003) lays out the requirements that EU member states ought to im-
plement to meet their obligation to install an effective enforcement mechanism. CESR (2007) 
states that 21 member states had at least partially implemented Standard No. 1 by 2006, 24 by 
2007, and 27 were projected to do so by 2008. At the same time, the CESR (2007) report 
documents a substantial degree of variation in the application of the Standard No. 1 criteria, 
and thus in institutional designs across member states. Today, ESMA (CESR‟s successor) 
coordinates these country-specific enforcement institutions to ensure consistent interpretation 
and application of IFRS. To that end, ESMA maintains a common European database of en-
forcement cases and decisions, and organizes the periodic European Enforcers‟ Coordination 
Sessions (EECS) (for details, see e.g. Ernstberger et al., 2012a). 
Empirically isolating the effects of the IAS Regulation is challenging because mandatory 
IFRS adoption in the EU coincided with a bundle of concurrent legal acts that had similar 
objectives. In the wake of IFRS adoption and the harmonization of enforcement institutions, 
several EU countries enacted legislation pertaining to securities regulation, reporting, and 
governance. Although many of these initiatives stemmed from EU legislation, the timing of 
their implementation at the country level varied. For example, EU Directives often contain 
options allowing for implementation differences at the member state level. Accordingly, 
Christensen et al. (2012) document heterogeneity in the timing of the implementation for the 
Market Abuse Directive of January 2003 (Directive 2003/6/EC) and the Transparency Direc-
tive of December 2004 (Directive 2004/109/EC). Moreover, they find that capital-market 
effects (liquidity, cost of capital) attributable to these initiatives vary at the country level de-
pending on the overall degree of enforcement quality. In a single-country context, Ernstber-
ger et al. (2012b) document the concurrent efforts in Germany to install an enforcement 
mechanism and legislation that implements various EU requirements to strengthen auditor 
independence and auditor oversight, finding evidence of ensuing decreases in earnings man-
agement and liquidity for affected firms.  
 
                                                          
5  At the beginning of 2011, CESR was replaced by ESMA, the European Securities and Markets Authority. 
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2.2. Economic consequences 
The impact of financial reporting is typically discussed in terms of economic conse-
quences, a concept introduced by Zeff (1978: 56) as “the impact of accounting reports on the 
decision-making behaviour of business, government, unions, investors and creditors.” In a 
similar vein, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983: 77) view accounting as having economic con-
sequences “if changes in the rules used to calculate accounting numbers alter the distribution 
of firms‟ cash flows, or the wealth of parties who use those numbers for contracting or deci-
sion making.” We follow these definitions and use the term economic consequences to denote 
any effects of financial reporting on firm values and on the wealth of those who make deci-
sions based on accounting information or are affected by such decisions. 
Financial reporting can trigger economic consequences through its information (valuation) 
and contracting (stewardship) roles.6 The first fundamental role is to provide current and po-
tential investors with decision-useful information on a company‟s business activities (e.g., 
IFRSF 2010a, para. OB2). Under this information role, financial reporting helps investors 
derive less noisy and/or less biased predictions of future cash flows, thus potentially affecting 
firm values by influencing the information set of current and potential investors.  
The second fundamental role of financial reporting is to enable the firm‟s stakeholders to 
hold management accountable for the resources entrusted to it (e.g., IFRSF 2010a, Introduc-
tion). Consistent with this stewardship function, contracts between the firm and its stake-
holders are frequently based on financial accounting numbers. These contracts are either set 
at the firm level (individual contracts) or determined for multiple firms, e.g., by means of 
regulation at the jurisdictional level or through collective private arrangements (collective 
contracts). Individual contracts include performance-based management compensation plans 
to mitigate shareholder-manager conflicts (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy, 1985) and 
lending agreements that contain financial covenants to mitigate conflicts between lenders and 
shareholders (e.g., Smith and Warner, 1979; Leftwich, 1983). Examples of collective con-
tracts include dividend payout restrictions tied to accounting income (e.g., Leuz et al., 1998) 
and the determination of taxable income based on financial statements (e.g., Shackelford and 
Shevlin, 2001). Focusing on this contracting role, positive accounting theory emphasizes that 
financial reporting, and especially accounting choices, affect contractual outcomes (e.g., 
                                                          
6 The information (contracting) role of financial reporting can also be referred to as the ex-ante (ex-post) role, 
which is primarily intended to address adverse selection (moral hazard) problems (e.g., Beyer et al. 2010).  
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Watts and Zimmermann, 1986; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). These outcomes affect 
stakeholders‟ decisions, which in turn influence firm values. 
It has long been acknowledged that the two fundamental roles of financial reporting are 
not necessarily compatible with each other. Indeed, recent research suggests that the informa-
tion role of accounting information is negatively related to its contracting role. For example, 
Gassen (2008) shows that stewardship-related demand for and properties of accounting in-
formation vary inversely with the valuation usefulness of that information. In a similar vein, 
N. Li (2010) documents that debt contracts tend to exclude transitory components from US 
GAAP earnings in order to increase contracting usefulness. To the extent that US GAAP 
earnings primarily reflect accounting‟s information role, these adjustments are indicative of 
incompatibilities between the two roles of accounting. 
2.3. Intended versus unintended consequences 
This paper takes the view that the economic consequences of any regulation potentially 
fall into two categories: those that relate to the explicitly stated objectives of the regulator, 
and those that do not.7 Where economic consequences speak to the degree of achievement of 
the stated objectives, we label them intended consequences, or main effects, whereas we 
think of the other category as unintended consequences, or side effects.8 This dichotomy is 
consistent with regulators being able to anticipate possible side effects, but any regulation 
potentially has consequences other than those touted by the regulator.9 
This paper is interested in research on the economic consequences of the European IAS 
Regulation. As discussed in section 2.1, the regulation‟s explicitly stated objectives include 
financial reporting effects (transparency and comparability) as well as overarching capital 
market and macroeconomic effects (efficient markets, growth and employment). We thus 
                                                          
7  Academic research in accounting has a long tradition of informing regulatory debates by assessing ex post 
the effectiveness of regulatory changes (e.g., Pope and McLeay, 2011; Fülbier et al., 2009). The usefulness 
of such research hinges on the extent to which the phenomena studied reflect the objectives of the regulation 
under analysis. Considering regulators‟ explicit statements made within the regulatory context on which re-
search evidence is being provided represents an effective way for researchers to discern these objectives. 
8  This dichotomy is distinct from the separation of direct and indirect effects. In the context of the IAS Regu-
lation, direct effects are those relating to the Regulation‟s accounting objectives (transparency and compara-
bility). In contrast, effects relating to the Regulation‟s capital market and macroeconomic objectives can 
viewed as indirect. In our dichotomy, both sets of effects would be viewed as intended. 
9  For example, although Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was “designed to promote the full and fair dis-
closure of information by issuers” (SEC 2000) in order to stamp out selective disclosure, research by Arya et 
al. (2005: 243) suggests potential “unintended consequences”, including “herding among analysts [that 
could] leave investors worse off”. However, this does not imply that the SEC did not anticipate and consider 
such effects. 
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label these effects the intended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, whereas we de-
fine all other effects as unintended. While this dichotomy is not identical to a categorization 
of economic consequences into benefits and costs, we expect that the intended consequences 
primarily have the character of benefits (e.g., increases in firm value) that stem from financial 
reporting‟s enhanced transparency and comparability.10 We consider the intended/unintended 
dichotomy useful for assessing whether the IAS Regulation was effective in achieving the 
explicitly stated objectives and to what extent it had side effects unrelated to these objectives. 
We therefore organize our review of extant literature around this dichotomy.11 
2.4. Supranational nature of the IAS Regulation 
The introduction of IFRS in the EU as well as concurrent governance, reporting and secu-
rities regulation efforts represent supranational regulation, i.e. an attempt to converge or har-
monize heterogeneous institutional and cultural environments. The EU regulator thus faces a 
higher-level version of the well-known problem of aggregating individual preferences into a 
societal welfare function (e.g. Demski, 1973). The variation in individual preferences is espe-
cially high at the supranational level due to variation in member states‟ preferences. The EU 
regulator‟s introduction of member state options can be seen as an attempt to reconcile these 
preferences. Accordingly, Leuz (2010: 233) points out that higher-level (supranational) regu-
lation generates benefits from standardization and exploits (informational) network external-
ities, while regulation at a lower level (member states) “allows more fine-tuning to needs of 
firms and investors, and hence avoids the problems of a one-size-fits-all-approach”. 
EU member states have traditionally used accounting data for heterogeneous purposes 
such as taxation, payout restrictions, or informing capital providers. The IAS Regulation is 
aimed explicitly at increasing the transparency and comparability of financial statements for 
listed firms. Its two-level approach – to mandate IFRS application for consolidated accounts 
of listed firms, while leaving extension to legal-entity accounts and/or non-listed firms at 
member states‟ discretion – can be viewed as the outcome of a trade-off between heterogene-
ity at the country level and supranational objectives at the community level.  
                                                          
10
  Naturally, research could show that mandatory IFRS adoption fails to increase, or even decreases, transpar-
ency or comparability. A related example from the Chinese context is provided by He et al. (2011). 
11
  Doing so requires judgment calls in several instances, including (1) when a paper addresses both sets of 
consequences, (2) when a paper uses intermediate constructs claimed to relate to the ultimate consequences 
of interest (e.g. papers addressing information asymmetry effects that proxy for cost of capital effects), (3) 
when the empirical metrics used measure the consequences of interest imperfectly, and (4) when high-level 
(e.g. macroeconomic) consequences variables are used and the transmission mechanisms causing the ob-
served effects remain unclear.  
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These two layers of regulatory outcomes of the IAS Regulation articulate with our distinc-
tion of intended versus unintended consequences. First, for the mandatory supranational part 
of the regulation, intended consequences are defined by the stated information (transparency 
and comparability) objectives. Unintended consequences from applying IFRS universally to 
the consolidated accounts of listed firms can thus result from financial data being used for 
other than information purposes, e.g. the contracting uses laid out above. Second, at the level 
of additional voluntary adoption of IFRS by member states, the objectives pursued may be 
different and would potentially include contracting contexts. For instance, while one member 
state may expect information benefits in the equity and credit markets for non-listed firms 
that apply IFRS, another may opt to prohibit use of IFRS for these firms due to strong links 
between financial accounting and taxation. 
Taken together, the supranational character of EU law-making, which trades off EU-wide 
goals with the diverse objectives of the member states, predicts different sets of intended and 
unintended consequences of the IAS Regulation at the supranational and the member state 
levels. In this review, we focus on mandatory IFRS adoption and, thus, on the supranational 
level, arguing that intended consequences are largely expected from information uses of fi-
nancial reporting, while unintended consequences primarily stem from contracting uses.12 
3. Review and discussion of research on the economic consequences of 
mandatory IFRS adoption 
This section reviews and discusses empirical studies on the economic consequences of 
mandatory IFRS adoption.13 We start by introducing the theoretical reasoning underlying 
these studies (section 3.1), continue with a summary of the empirical literature (section 3.2) 
and conclude by discussing common research design issues (section 3.3). 
3.1. Theoretical background 
The empirical studies reviewed in this section are motivated by the assumption that man-
dating IFRS has the potential to improve (transparency objective in section 2.1) and/or har-
monize (comparability objective in section 2.1) financial reporting practices across countries. 
Studies on capital-market or macroeconomic effects moreover assume that improved and/or 
                                                          
12 The two uses of financial reporting interact where, for example, improvements along the information dimen-
sion enhance financial reporting‟s efficiency in contracting settings (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010). 
13
  We focus this section on the intended consequences. The scarce extant literature on the unintended conse-
quences is discussed in the context of our suggestions for future research (section 4.2).  
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harmonized reporting practices yield positive user responses that lead to higher firm values 
on average. It is debatable whether these assumptions are justified. 
Since accounting regimes generally provide firms with reporting discretion,14 recent re-
search concludes that reporting practices are to a large extent determined by firms‟ reporting 
incentives (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Burgstahler et al., 2006). These incentives are shaped by 
jurisdiction-level institutional factors such as legal systems, enforcement regimes, and capi-
tal-market forces, as well as by firm-level compensation and financing arrangements, owner-
ship structures, and governance mechanisms. Hence, the impact of IFRS adoption on report-
ing practices is likely to be limited if a firm‟s institutional environment and firm-level incen-
tives remain unchanged (e.g., Ball, 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Hail et al., 2010).  
Even if reporting practices become more transparent and/or comparable subsequent to 
IFRS adoption, the economic consequences of such improvements are unclear ex ante. Theo-
retical models show that the directional impact of high-quality accounting information on the 
cost of capital is ambiguous (e.g., Lambert et al., 2007). This finding may help explain why 
empirical evidence on the relation between financial reporting properties and the cost of capi-
tal is inconclusive (for an overview, see Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Similarly, it is unclear 
whether more comparable financial statements enhance cross-border investment if underin-
vestment in foreign equities is due to behavioural biases or rational tendencies to invest in 
geographically proximate countries (e.g., Beneish and Yohn, 2008; for a theoretical model on 
the effects of accounting harmonization in equity markets, see Barth et al., 1999). 
This discussion shows that prior research does not necessarily support the assumption that 
mandatory IFRS adoption yields more transparent and/or comparable financial reports and, 
even if it does, that it will necessarily trigger positive economic consequences. It is important 
to keep this caveat in mind when interpreting the empirical evidence discussed next. 
3.2. Empirical evidence15 
In line with the framework of IFRS adoption objectives introduced in section 2.1, we dis-
tinguish three types of effects: financial reporting effects, capital-market effects, and macro-
economic effects. While financial reporting effects reflect the immediate impact of the 
                                                          
14  It is not clear whether IFRS provide financial statement preparers with more or less discretion than other sets 
of accounting standards. Rather, any set of accounting standards inevitably requires preparers to exercise re-
porting discretion and make subjective judgments (e.g., Leuz, 2006; Nobes, 2006). 
15  We present a subset of studies in tabulated form. To keep the size of the tables manageable, we restrict them 
to cross-country studies and, where possible, published papers. In the narrative, we also refer to closely re-
lated studies that are not included in the tables. We caution that our selection is necessarily subjective. 
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change in standards on properties of financial statements, capital-market and macroeconomic 
effects relate to financial statement users‟ responses to mandatory IFRS adoption. 
3.2.1.  Financial reporting effects 
Table 1 summarizes empirical evidence on the financial reporting effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption which we group into three categories: compliance and accounting choice stud-
ies (Panel A), studies analyzing the properties of accounting numbers (Panel B), and value 
relevance studies (Panel C).16 
Compliance and accounting choice studies 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that empirical evidence on compliance with IFRS requirements 
and accounting choices under IFRS is limited, and that sample sizes are relatively small, pre-
sumably because appropriate data need to be hand-collected. Glaum et al. (2010) and Verriest 
et al. (2011) provide evidence of substantial non-compliance with IFRS disclosure require-
ments in the adoption year. Both studies also find that country- and/or firm-level incentives 
determine the degree of compliance. Similar evidence is presented by Cascino and Gassen 
(2011) for a sample of German and Italian firms. Kvaal and Nobes (2010) find substantial 
cross-country variation in IFRS policy choices in the adoption year, which is largely deter-
mined by pre-IFRS national reporting practices. In a follow-up study, Kvaal and Nobes 
(2011) confirm that these country-specific patterns persist several years after mandatory IFRS 
adoption. These results are in line with those from non-academic surveys (e.g., KPMG and 
von Keitz, 2006; Ernst & Young, 2007) and call into question whether IFRS adoption alone 
facilitates the comparability of financial statements across countries. 
Accounting properties studies 
The research summarized in Panel B of Table 1 relates to the effect of mandatory IFRS on 
properties of accounting numbers. Studies analyzing common earnings properties such earn-
ings smoothing, conditional conservatism or discretionary accruals find that mandatory IFRS 
adoption either has no significant impact (Atwood et al., 2011) or even a negative effect 
(Ahmed et al., 2012; Callao and Jarne, 2010). These results resonate in earnings management 
studies such as Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) and Capkun et al. (2011) as well as in single-
industry studies (e.g., Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011, for the banking sector).  
                                                          
16  We categorize value relevance studies with the literature on accounting effects, but acknowledge that 
changes in value relevance around mandatory IFRS adoption may also reflect capital-market effects, e.g., in 
the form of IFRS-induced changes in the market value of equity. 
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Studies examining comparability provide mixed evidence. Cascino and Gassen (2011) 
show that the cross-country comparability of financial statements increases following manda-
tory IFRS adoption provided that compliance incentives are strong. Lang et al. (2010) find 
that earnings comparability decreases and earnings comovement increases post-IFRS. How-
ever, the increase in earnings comovement coincides with negative effects on firms‟ informa-
tion environments. Liao et al. (2011) show that French and German IFRS earnings and book 
values are comparably priced in the first IFRS year, but later become less comparable. Taken 
together, these results are inconsistent with mandatory IFRS adoption significantly enhancing 
the transparency or comparability of financial statements.  
Value relevance studies 
Panel C of Table 1 presents empirical evidence on the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on the value relevance of accounting numbers in equity and debt markets. Aharony et al. 
(2010) find that the equity value relevance of three accounting items that are particularly im-
portant under IFRS increases following the introduction of IFRS. Barth et al. (2011) provide 
evidence that the difference between local GAAP net income and restated IFRS net income is 
associated with stock prices and returns. The evidence related to value relevance in debt mar-
kets is less clear. While Bhat et al. (2011) find no impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the 
sensitivity of credit default swap spreads to accounting information, Wu and Zhang (2009b) 
show that credit ratings are more sensitive to accounting information post-IFRS provided that 
legal enforcement is strong. The latter result is consistent with Florou et al. (2010). Overall, 
these findings provide some evidence of increasing value relevance following mandatory 
IFRS adoption, especially in equity markets.  
3.2.2.  Capital-market effects 
Table 2 summarizes empirical evidence on capital-market effects of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. This research area can be classified into two broad categories: studies that directly 
analyze economic consequences in capital markets using measures that are strongly associ-
ated with firm values (Panel A), and studies providing indirect evidence by examining capi-
tal-market perceptions of accounting quality (Panel B).  
Direct evidence on economic consequences in capital markets 
Panel A of Table 2 illustrates that the first set of studies find nearly unanimous support for 
capital-market benefits following mandatory IFRS adoption. Specifically, the evidence is 
consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption increasing stock market liquidity (Daske et al., 
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2008, see also Muller et al., 2011), decreasing the cost of equity capital (S. Li, 2010), increas-
ing cross-border equity investments by mutual funds (DeFond et al., 2011; see also Yu, 2009) 
as well as by individual investors (Brüggemann et al., 2011), increasing equity investments 
by institutional investors (Florou and Pope, 2011), decreasing the cost of public debt (Florou 
and Kosi, 2011) and increasing firm-level capital investment efficiency (Schleicher et al., 
2010; see also Biddle et al., 2011). Although many of these effects are confined to a subset of 
firms with appropriate country institutions (such as a strong legal enforcement system), these 
findings support the expectation that mandatory IFRS adoption has the potential to yield di-
rect capital-market benefits. 
Indirect evidence on economic consequences in capital markets 
The second set of studies uses proxies for the quality of financial statement information as 
perceived by capital-market participants. These perceptions, in turn, are assumed to influence 
firm values. Panel B of Table 2 shows that empirical evidence on these indirect capital-
market effects also almost unanimously supports a beneficial impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Specifically, mandatory IFRS adoption increases the information content of earn-
ings announcements (Landsman et al., 2011), increases cross-border information transfers 
from earnings announcements (Kim and Li, 2011; see also Wang, 2011), increases stock 
price synchronicity in the longer run (Beuselinck et al., 2010) and enhances the quality of 
analysts‟ information environment in general (Byard et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2011; see also 
Panaretou et al., 2011) and foreign analysts in particular (Tan et al., 2011). Again, some of 
these effects are confined to firms from countries with appropriate supporting institutions 
such as a strong legal enforcement. In summary, these results provide evidence consistent 
with mandatory IFRS adoption leading to indirect capital-market benefits. 
3.2.3.   Macroeconomic effects 
Table 3 summarizes empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Beneish et al. (2010) find that mandatory IFRS adoption increases foreign debt 
investment, but not foreign equity investment. In contrast, Amiram (2009) provides evidence 
that foreign equity investment increases post-IFRS and that this effect is stronger in countries 
with low corruption and strong investor protection. The latter result is consistent with 
Khurana and Michas (2011) and Shima and Gordon (2011) who focus on US portfolio in-
vestment in foreign equity. Chen et al. (2011) and Márquez-Ramos (2011) show that foreign 
direct investment increases following mandatory IFRS adoption and that the size of this ef-
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fect depends on country institutions such as pre-adoption IFRS conformity. Taken together, 
extant evidence generally supports the notion that mandatory IFRS adoption yields macro-
economic benefits. 
3.3. Discussion of research design issues 
3.3.1.   Conflicting findings 
Our review of the extant empirical evidence on the economic consequences of mandatory 
IFRS adoption yields two main insights. First, the financial reporting effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption seem to be limited as non-compliance is substantial, national accounting 
choice patterns remain and earnings transparency and comparability metrics typically do not 
change or even deteriorate. Second, there is plentiful and almost unanimous evidence that the 
mandatory introduction of IFRS coincides with capital-market and macroeconomic benefits. 
To the extent that capital-market and macroeconomic benefits are thought to be achieved 
through IFRS making financial statements more transparent and/or comparable, these two 
sets of research findings appear to be at odds (see section 2.1).  
This disagreement stands in sharp contrast to the empirical evidence on the economic con-
sequences of voluntary IFRS adoption reviewed by Soderstrom and Sun (2007). For example, 
while Barth et al. (2008) provide evidence of improving accounting properties following vol-
untary IFRS adoption, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find opposite results. Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) document lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume for voluntary 
adopters, suggesting that the cost of equity capital decreases after the switch to IFRS. In con-
trast, Daske (2006) does not find a decrease in the implied cost of equity capital around vol-
untary IFRS adoption. Soderstrom and Sun (2007) point out that research design issues such 
as self-selection, omitted variables problems and mis-specified regression models are likely 
to contribute to these mixed findings. 
We conclude that whereas empirical studies related to voluntary IFRS adoption provide 
conflicting evidence within the same categories of economic consequences (financial report-
ing effects, capital market effects), the mandatory IFRS literature is similar within but incon-
sistent across categories. Hence, the literature on mandatory IFRS adoption is likely to suffer 
from different research design issues than empirical studies related to voluntary IFRS adop-
tion. We offer two non-mutually exclusive explanations for the disagreement in research 
findings on the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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3.3.2.  Understated financial reporting effects 
Whereas the limited impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on financial reporting outcomes 
is not inconsistent with the notion that incentives dominate accounting standards in this re-
gard (see section 3.2), a potential alternative explanation is that the literature understates the 
financial reporting effects of mandatory IFRS adoption by failing to apply measures that are 
relevant to financial statement users. Our review shows that most studies on IFRS financial 
reporting effects follow prior literature in using contentious „earnings quality‟ metrics that 
rely on aggregate numbers retrieved from commercial databases. Financial statement users 
are certainly also interested in information beyond such aggregate numbers. Yet, empirical 
evidence on how such information (e.g., additional disclosures) changes following mandatory 
IFRS adoption is scarce. We conclude that extant evidence on the financial reporting effects 
of mandatory IFRS adoption is in line with prior literature but that more insights on the im-
pact beyond aggregate numbers is warranted (see also section 4.1). 
3.3.3.  Overstated capital-market effects 
The second potential explanation for the inconsistency in research findings is that the lit-
erature overstates the capital-market and macroeconomic effects of mandatory IFRS adop-
tion. Since the IFRS mandate applies to most public firms in the EU, self-selection at the 
firm-level is less of an issue compared to the literature on voluntary IFRS adoption.17 How-
ever, introducing IFRS at one point in time for all firms causes a different identification prob-
lem, namely the challenge of disentangling the potential impact of mandatory IFRS adoption 
from other concurrent changes that influence the outcome under study. These concurrent 
changes either affect financial statements as well (e.g., the introduction of more rigid en-
forcement mechanisms; see section 2.1 for details) or are outside the realm of financial re-
porting (e.g., the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive, see again section 2.1 for 
details). Only concurrent changes with no impact on financial reports have the potential to 
explain the contradictory results from mandatory IFRS adoption studies finding capital-
market but no financial reporting effects. If these accounting-unrelated regulatory changes are 
not appropriately controlled for in the research design, the results suffer from low internal 
validity and cannot be solely attributed to mandatory IFRS adoption.  
                                                          
17  Note that firms can potentially select to avoid the IFRS mandate, for example by delisting from the stock 
exchange or by switching to an unofficial trading segment where EU regulation does not apply. For evidence 
on increased delisting activity around the introduction of IFRS, see Vulcheva (2009). More subtly, firms 
could restructure their activities to avoid or dampen the anticipated impact of individual IFRS. For evidence 
from Dutch preference share buy-backs and restructurings, see de Jong et al. (2006). 
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The studies reviewed in section 3.2 typically attempt to circumvent the identification prob-
lem by implementing a difference-in-differences design using control groups of firms not 
concurrently subject to mandatory IFRS adoption. While certainly better than having no 
benchmark, this approach relies on the strong assumption that these control firms reflect the 
counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened to adopting firms in the absence of adoption.  
Most studies also report cross-sectional heterogeneity in the IFRS effect related to coun-
try-level institutional factors (e.g., a rule of law variable to proxy for the strength of the legal 
enforcement system). This strategy would allow evaluating the internal validity if the varia-
tion in the IFRS effect could be predicted unambiguously. However, this is typically not the 
case. While institutional factors certainly contribute to the quality of financial reporting in 
general (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003), it is less clear whether and how they are associated with 
changes in reporting practices following mandatory IFRS adoption (e.g., Holthausen, 2009). 
Hence, present evidence on cross-sectional heterogeneity in the IFRS effect is mainly de-
scriptive. We conclude that extant literature on the capital-market and macroeconomic effects 
of mandatory IFRS adoption suffers from an identification problem, suggesting that caution 
is necessary in interpreting the results. However, this status quo also offers opportunities for 
future research, which we discuss in section 4.1. 
In addition to the identification problem, the empirical literature on capital-market effects 
of mandatory IFRS adoption faces the challenge of having to deal with potentially biased 
samples. The CESR (2007) review of the implementation and enforcement of IFRS in the EU 
reports that, based on information provided by national enforcement institutions across 
Europe, a total of 5,323 equity issuers met the requirements of the IAS Regulation and con-
sequently had to prepare consolidated IFRS accounts for the fiscal year 2005. Table 4 com-
pares this precise estimate of the actual population of IFRS adopters with the sample sizes 
used in four representative cross-country studies discussed in the previous section (Daske et 
al., 2008; DeFond et al., 2011; Landsman et al., 2011; Byard et al., 2011). This comparison 
illustrates that sample sizes in most academic studies are substantially smaller than the actual 
number of IFRS adopters. The main reason for this gap is that commercial database coverage 
outside the US suffers from a systematic bias towards large companies (e.g., Garcia Lara et 
al., 2006). Empirical studies provide strong evidence that large companies are more likely to 
switch to IFRS voluntarily (see, e.g., Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005), suggesting that these firms 
expect net benefits from IFRS. Consistent with this notion, Christensen et al. (2007) estimate 
a proxy for a firm‟s willingness to adopt IFRS based on firm size as a major determinant. 
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They further show that this proxy predicts cross-sectional variation in the immediate and 
long-run stock market response to events related to the EU‟s decision to require IFRS. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the database bias towards large companies potentially 
distorts research findings by overstating the positive effects of mandatory IFRS adoption.  
Finally, it is important to separate the source of an economic consequence from the em-
pirical construct used to measure it. Specifically, capital-market outcomes potentially reflect 
economic consequences that stem from the information or contracting roles of financial re-
porting. For example, Horton and Serafeim (2010) as well as Christensen et al. (2009) ob-
serve significant stock market reactions to IFRS reconciliations in the UK. However, the two 
papers provide opposite interpretations of this phenomenon. While Horton and Serafeim 
(2010) argue that their evidence is consistent with IFRS reconciliations containing value-
relevant information for shareholders, Christensen et al. (2009) claim that the stock market 
reactions reflect wealth transfers between lenders and shareholders. They (p. 1168) conclude 
that “failure to consider accounting‟s debt-contracting role risks attributing IFRS reconcilia-
tion market reactions to information about a given firm‟s future operating cash flows rather 
than information about the likelihood of violating covenants. This, in turn, means that one of 
the costs of mandatory IFRS (i.e., the effect on existing contracts) may be incorrectly identi-
fied as a benefit.” Rather than commenting on the relative merits of these conflicting posi-
tions, we stress that a lesson for future research on mandatory IFRS adoption is that observed 
capital-market outcomes require further analysis to ascertain whether the underlying cause is 
more consistent with an information explanation (i.e., an intended consequence according to 
our definition) or a contracting explanation (i.e., an unintended consequence). 
4. Avenues for future IFRS adoption research 
4.1.  Intended consequences 
  Extant results of the literature on intended consequences reviewed in section 3 could 
simply be artefacts of the short history of mandatory IFRS adoption reflecting a combination 
of idiosyncratic, transitory effects of first-time adoption and low statistical power due to rela-
tively short analysis periods and resulting small numbers of observations.18 For this reason, 
an easily available research opportunity lies in the re-examination of potential IFRS effects 
using longer time series (e.g., Kvaal and Nobes, 2011 on accounting choice). 
                                                          
18  Tables 1-3 show that the average mandatory IFRS adoption paper covers two to three (and a maximum of 
four) post-adoption years, if the transition year (2005 for most firms) is not counted. 
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However, the discussion in section 3.3 indicates that the causes of the apparent conflict 
across types of mandatory IFRS adoption effects are more systematic. We specifically sug-
gest three areas for future research to address this mismatch. First, we know little about how 
mandatory IFRS adoption affects financial statements beyond the aggregate numbers re-
trieved from commercial databases. Evidence on whether firms actually comply with, and 
how they make accounting choices within, the restrictions of IFRS is also limited. It is there-
fore still to a large extent an open question whether financial statements have become more 
transparent and comparable following mandatory IFRS adoption, as measured by detailed 
financial reporting outcomes. To address this important issue, we advocate more disclosure, 
compliance and accounting choice studies that rely on manually collected and thus finer data. 
Such datasets, if sufficiently large, could also help validate existing aggregate measures, for 
example by documenting the extent to which common cross-country comparability metrics 
are explained by actual accounting choices. 
Second, we encourage researchers to develop more convincing identification strategies 
when analyzing capital-market or macroeconomic effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. The 
challenge is to disentangle a potential IFRS effect from other concurrent changes that may or 
may not affect financial reporting. These different forces are difficult to separate in cross-
country studies. Focusing on more specific settings (e.g., a single country or trading segment) 
is likely to be a useful starting point for better understanding and controlling for contempora-
neous non-IFRS effects, and should thus increase the internal validity of results.  
Another strategy to deal with the identification problem is to confirm internal validity by 
analyzing whether the potential IFRS effect varies in the cross-section according to theory-
based predictions. For example, future research could directly link potential capital-market 
effects of mandatory IFRS adoption to changes in reporting practices at the firm level. The 
underlying assumption of this approach is that capital-market reactions stem from mandatory 
IFRS adoption having a material impact on financial statements. Potential proxies for such 
changes in reporting practices include the difference between local GAAP and IFRS earnings 
as reported in the reconciliation statements of the first IFRS report, or changes in firm-
specific earnings management scores around IFRS adoption.19 As a second approach, we 
suggest relating potential capital-market effects to proxies for firm-level benefits of manda-
                                                          
19  Recent empirical studies have started to use reconciliation data to evaluate cross-sectional differences in the 
capital-market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption (e.g., Horton et. al., 2011). Changes in firm-specific 
earnings management scores, in contrast, have so far only been used in the context of voluntary IFRS adop-
tion (Daske et al., 2011). 
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tory IFRS adoption. Christensen et al. (2007), for example, estimate these benefits with a 
counterfactual proxy for a company‟s willingness to adopt IFRS. This proxy is based on 
characteristics of German voluntary IFRS adopters and applied to companies in the UK 
where voluntary IFRS adoption was not allowed. Future research could apply a similar 
method to other settings to evaluate whether potential IFRS effects are indeed positively as-
sociated with expected benefits. Alternatively, proxies for the benefits of IFRS adoption 
could be based on firm-specific stock market reactions to events that changed the likelihood 
of mandatory IFRS introduction in Europe (for a review of this literature, see Soderstrom and 
Sun, 2007).  
Finally, we suggest addressing the potential sample bias in extant evidence on the capital-
market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. As our analysis of the current literature shows, 
this stream of research relies on commercial databases that suffer from a systematic bias to-
wards large companies. We therefore encourage researchers to manually gather data on 
smaller companies and evaluate whether these experienced systematically different capital-
market reactions to mandatory IFRS adoption than their larger counterparts. 
4.2. Unintended consequences 
We define unintended consequences as those absent from the IAS Regulation‟s explicitly 
stated objectives (section 2.3).20 These unintended consequences which relate largely to the 
contracting uses of IFRS financial statements have received little research attention so far. 
We structure our suggestions in this section around these contracting uses distinguishing be-
tween compensation schemes, lending agreements, dividend payouts, taxation, and other 
regulatory restrictions. Related extant evidence is still scarce and discussed along the way. 
Compensation schemes 
Compensation schemes commonly have elements based on accounting-based performance 
metrics in order to align managers‟ and shareholders‟ interests. In equilibrium, they can be 
thought of as efficient responses to an agency problem. If performance metrics are based on 
GAAP in force at the date of calculation („rolling GAAP‟), changes in accounting rules such 
as the mandatory adoption of IFRS will affect contractual outcomes (i.e., bonuses). This 
                                                          
20  The early announcement of the IAS Regulation in 2002 enabled managers to act opportunistically in antici-
pation of certain IFRS effects. Wang and Welker (2011) provide the only related empirical evidence we are 
aware of. They find that firms with larger IFRS-induced decreases in net income are more likely to issue eq-
uity, and issue a larger volume of equity, during the three years leading up to mandatory IFRS adoption. 
These results are consistent with management exploiting private information about the effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption to decrease the cost of equity financing at the expense of outside investors. 
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change in GAAP will therefore change the efficiency of GAAP in resolving the agency con-
flict upsetting the previously existing equilibrium and affecting the distribution of wealth 
between managers and shareholders if compensation plans are not adjusted.21 Attempts to 
restore the equilibrium can include managers engaging in potentially value-decreasing in-
vestment and financing decisions (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983) and costly renegotiation 
of compensation schemes (in anticipation of and/or subsequent to the change in GAAP). We 
argue that any repercussions of mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting-based compensation 
schemes in our definition represent unintended consequences. 
Future research could analyze empirically the extent to which these effects occur. First, if 
equilibriums are upset by the mandatory adoption of IFRS and corresponding adjustments are 
made, the pervasiveness and content of accounting-based compensation arrangements should 
change. For a sample of listed UK firms, Voulgaris et al. (2011) collect data on compensation 
contracts for period around mandatory IFRS adoption (2002-2009). They document a signifi-
cant decline in the weight placed on accounting-based measures (earnings per share) as op-
posed to market-based measures following mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Second, to the extent disrupted equilibriums are not restored through appropriate counter-
measures, we should observe changes in the association of accounting amounts with man-
agement compensation amounts. To our knowledge, Chen and Tang (2009) provide the only 
corresponding empirical study so far.22 Using a sample of 70 property firms from Hong 
Kong, they show that the gains (but not losses) from revaluation of investment property are 
positively associated with executive cash compensation after mandatory IFRS adoption, but 
not before. These effects increase in the severity of agency problems between managers and 
shareholders (e.g., for firms with lower founding family ownership). Since revaluation in-
come did not affect profit before IFRS adoption, these results suggest that compensation con-
tracts have not been adjusted to offset the change in accounting rules. Hence, managers bene-
fited from mandatory IFRS adoption by receiving higher salaries – which from the perspec-
tive of shareholders may represent a potentially costly side-effect of regulation. 
Third, further repercussions could ensue for the efficiency of GAAP as a basis for man-
agement compensation. For example, Wu and Zhang (2010) provide evidence that the sensi-
                                                          
21  Defining accounting-based performance metrics instead in terms of „fixed GAAP‟ represents a (potentially 
costly) way of insulating compensation arrangements from the effects of such changes in GAAP.  
22  Using voluntary adoption data, Wu and Zhang (2009a) show that adoption of IFRS or US-GAAP is associ-
ated with increases in the sensitivities of CEO turnover and employee layoffs to accounting earnings.  
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tivity of CEO turnover to the accounting performance of foreign peers increased following 
mandatory IFRS adoption. These results indicate that increased cross-country comparability 
made accounting information better-suited for assessing manager performance for compensa-
tion purposes in the context of relative performance evaluation.  
Evidence of an opposite effect is provided by Voulgaris et al. (2011), who attribute the de-
cline in accounting-based compensation contracts post-IFRS to the increased noise in earn-
ings. They argue that, e.g. due to fair value accounting and ensuing earnings volatility, IFRS 
earnings are less useful for compensation contracts, because market noise in earnings reduces 
its usefulness as an indicator of management performance or effort. In line with this conjec-
ture, they find that the signal-to-noise ratio of earnings is negatively associated with the use 
of accounting earnings for management compensation post-IFRS. For the specific setting of 
Canadian workers‟ compensation boards, Rixon and Faseruk (2009) conclude that IFRS 
adoption “will likely introduce challenges in providing stakeholders with information that 
will enable them to evaluate performance and accountability” (p. 26). Studies (summarized in 
section 3.2) assessing the effect of IFRS adoption on certain financial reporting properties 
will also speak indirectly to this issue to the extent that the properties analyzed (e.g. smooth-
ness) are unambiguous in their suitability for performance measurement. Furthermore, any 
changes in the relative weights of accounting-based versus stock-based or option-based com-
ponents within executive compensation packages may be indicative of this effect. Future re-
search could further explore the appropriateness of IFRS information for performance meas-
urement directly. 
Finally, mandatory IFRS adoption could affect the choice of certain compensation ar-
rangements such as pension plans. Dixon and Monk (2009) discuss the effects of IFRS adop-
tion on the use of defined benefit pension plans. They argue that the volatility effects of fair 
value accounting for pension plans under IFRS set incentives for firms to move towards ar-
rangements that transfer the retirement-income risk to the individual. For the Netherlands, 
Swinkels (2011) corroborates this finding empirically. The literature reviewed by Kiosse and 
Peasnell (2009) provides evidence consistent with accounting rules affecting the allocation of 
pension plan assets (for IFRS in the UK: Amir et al., 2010) as well as firms‟ decisions to fund 
(for IFRS in Germany: Stadler and Lobe, 2010), terminate, freeze, curtail or convert their 
defined benefit plans. The authors conclude that “accounting matters, though perhaps not as 
much as is sometimes claimed” (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009: 264).  
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Lending agreements 
Accounting-based debt covenants in corporate lending agreements serve to deter managers 
from taking actions that benefit shareholders at the expense of lenders (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Such actions include the payment of liquidat-
ing dividends to shareholders or substitution of low-risk for high-risk investments. Breach of 
the covenant, for example exceeding (falling short of) a maximum (minimum) leverage (in-
terest coverage) ratio, triggers default upon which the lender can terminate the agreement, 
renegotiate interest rates, seize additional collateral and/or take similar action (e.g., Smith and 
Warner, 1979). Hence, changes in accounting rules such as mandatory adoption of IFRS can 
result in wealth transfers between lenders and shareholders if accounting amounts and/or 
covenant thresholds are not adjusted leading to an upset of the previous equilibrium 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). Since such adjustments are costly, debt covenants often 
include provisions that determine how to deal with future accounting rule changes by man-
dating to use either rolling GAAP or GAAP in force when the contract was set up 
(fixed/frozen GAAP) (e.g., Leftwich, 1983; Citron, 1992).  
Accounting-based debt covenants raise research questions similar to those discussed in the 
previous compensation context. First, if contracting equilibriums are disrupted by mandatory 
adoption of IFRS (consistent with covenants being based on rolling GAAP) and corrective 
adjustments are made, the frequency and design of accounting-based covenants should 
change. For example, renegotiations of covenant thresholds may be observed.  
Second, if covenants are based on rolling GAAP and are not adjusted following IFRS 
adoption, we should observe changes in outcomes, i.e. a redistribution of wealth between 
lenders and shareholders. Ormrod and Taylor (2004) predict this effect for the UK because 
debt covenants in this market are typically based on rolling GAAP. Christensen et al. (2009) 
provide empirical evidence in line with this prediction. Their analysis based on a sample of 
137 UK firms proceeds in two steps. First, they show that reconciliations between earnings 
under IFRS and UK GAAP for 2004 predict future IFRS earnings. Since rolling GAAP is 
prevalent in UK debt contracts, IFRS reconciliations contain information on the likelihood of 
covenant violations. Specifically, a positive difference between IFRS and UK-GAAP earn-
ings reduces the likelihood of covenant violations, and vice versa. In the second step, Chris-
tensen et al. (2009) find that the reconciliation difference between IFRS and UK-GAAP earn-
ings is positively related to abnormal equity returns on the announcement day suggesting that 
the stock market did not anticipate the impact of IFRS on earnings. This effect is more pro-
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nounced among companies that are expected to have greater contracting and monitoring costs 
(e.g., smaller firms and firms with lower interest cover). Taken together, Christensen et al. 
(2009) provide indirect evidence that mandatory IFRS adoption leads to wealth transfers be-
tween lenders and shareholders through its impact on debt covenants. We are not aware of 
any other study that explicitly examines the effect of IFRS adoption on lending agreements.23 
Third, researchers could analyze whether the association between relevant ratios and the 
occurrence of covenant violations changes as a result of mandatory IFRS adoption, which 
would be consistent with the accounting change affecting contractual outcomes. 
Two challenges contribute to the evident gap in the literature on the unintended conse-
quences of mandatory IFRS adoption on compensation schemes and lending agreements. 
First, it is difficult to obtain information on the relevant contractual arrangements. For exam-
ple, publicly available data on lending agreements is very limited in the EU. Christensen et 
al. (2009) therefore use financial statement data to construct proxy variables (e.g., firm size, 
interest coverage) for the existence of covenants and the likelihood and costs of covenant 
violation. We suggest researchers to follow a similar strategy in case the data at hand do not 
allow for direct tests. The second challenge is that some unintended consequences of manda-
tory IFRS adoption may only apply to specific settings and, thus, are difficult to identify in a 
large-sample analysis. We encourage researchers to gain and exploit expert knowledge about 
such settings. While this strategy may not always lead to insights that extend easily to more 
general settings, it has the potential to provide important small-sample or case study evidence 
of high internal validity (e.g., de Jong et al., 2006). 
Dividend payouts 
Unintended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption may also stem from the interrela-
tion of accounting earnings and dividend payouts. For example, according to the EU‟s second 
Company Law Directive‟s (Capital Directive24) “balance sheet test”, the maximum amount of 
distributable profit of EU corporations is restricted to accumulated accounting earnings. 
These accounting earnings have traditionally been calculated in companies‟ unconsolidated, 
                                                          
23  De Jong et al. (2006) provide evidence that firms incur costs to alter their financing structures in an effort to 
avoid certain predictable effects of IFRS adoption on their financial statement ratios, including those as-
sumed to be used in debt covenants.  
24 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by member states of companies within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited li-
ability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent, Official Journal L 026, 31/01/1977: 1-13.  
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legal-entity financial statements under domestic accounting rules. However, group earnings 
may be viewed as a de facto basis for distributable income because owners of the parent pri-
marily observe the (IFRS) group accounts rather than the parent‟s legal-entity financial 
statements.25 As a result, they may claim a portion of group earnings as dividends, possibly 
because group earnings are perceived as a better performance indicator than the parent firm‟s 
unconsolidated earnings. In addition, some investors may be unaware that the parent firm‟s 
unconsolidated earnings commonly serve as the legal basis for dividend payouts. In both sce-
narios, IFRS adoption in the group accounts is likely to influence investors‟ dividend claims, 
which in turn may affect firms‟ dividend policies. 
We are not aware of empirical research that explores these issues directly in the context of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. However, Goncharov and van Triest (2011b) show how a large 
profit, recorded due to IFRS-style fair value gains by Russian energy giant United Energy 
System (UES), resulted in an omission of dividends. Due to the required use of accounting 
earnings to calculate mandatory minimum preferred dividends, UES saw itself under pressure 
to pay preferred dividends on large unrealized fair value gains. The only option to avoid this 
payment was to set dividends to zero for all its shareholders, common and preferred. This 
case study suggests that IFRS adoption could interact with legal requirements to cause unin-
tended wealth redistributions if it is too costly or impossible to contract around it. 
Goncharov and van Triest (2011a) follow up with large-sample evidence on whether up-
ward fair-value adjustments of financial assets lead to increased dividend payouts resulting in 
the distribution of unrealized earnings. Contrary to concerns commonly voiced by regulators, 
the evidence suggests that upward-revaluing firms actually decrease dividend payouts. The 
authors discuss two possible explanations for this finding. First, managers may use a large 
increase in transitory earnings to opportunistically reduce dividends, which are typically 
thought of as a certain fraction of persistent earnings. This explanation is consistent with 
wealth transfers occurring between managers and shareholders. Second, fair value gains may 
be correlated with an unobservable response by managers to high growth. Growth could be 
perceived as unsustainable and dividends are reduced towards a certain percentage of ex-
pected persistent earnings, or high growth expectations lead to expanded investment which in 
turn reduces free cash flow. Goncharov and van Triest (2011a) are unable to empirically dis-
tinguish between these conflicting explanations. However, their findings suggest that more 
                                                          
25 Pellens et al. (2003) report German survey evidence broadly consistent with this notion. 
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frequent use of fair value as a measurement basis has the potential to increase the proportion 
of transitory earnings (see also Hitz, 2007) and thus upsets longstanding relations between 
accounting earnings and dividends. To the extent that a switch from domestic accounting 
standards to IFRS typically increases the importance of fair value accounting, mandatory 
IFRS adoption may therefore cause changes in dividend policies. 
Taxation 
The mandatory adoption of IFRS potentially also affects firms‟ income tax situation, either 
directly or through its impact on financial accounting where taxation is based on it. EU mem-
ber states have traditionally linked income tax accounting to financial accounting, albeit to a 
varying degree, and no EU country mandates completely separate tax books. Typically, tax 
law anchors the determination base on the financial statements of the legal entity, and sets out 
adjustments to reported financial accounting income. For example, the German “authorita-
tiveness principle” (Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip; section 5 of the German Income Tax Code), 
prescribes that accounting profit calculated according to German domestic GAAP be the de-
termination base for company taxation, unless specific tax rules require otherwise (Schanz 
and Schanz, 2010). Similarly, in the UK, Section 103 of the Finance Act 2002 requires profits 
for taxation to be computed in accordance with domestic GAAP, and Section 74 of the Taxes 
Act 1998 sets out detailed adjustments for expenses not deductible in calculating taxable in-
come (Endres et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the strength of this book-tax link varies. In some 
countries, such as Germany, this link effectively leads to a convergence of financial account-
ing and tax accounting, whereas in other countries, such as Norway, Poland, and the Nether-
lands, financial accounts and tax accounts remain distinct. 
The role of IFRS in determining accounting income, which in turn is linked to taxation, 
again varies across member states.26 Only Cyprus and Malta mandate IFRS accounting exclu-
sively, whereas Slovakia restricts application of IFRS in single-entity accounts to banks, in-
surance companies, and very large corporations. Whereas, few countries (Estonia, Ireland, 
and Slovenia) allow the use of IFRS instead of domestic GAAP as the tax determination base, 
the majority restrict determination of accounting income for tax purposes to domestic GAAP. 
However, in some countries including the UK, domestic GAAP are broadly in line with 
IFRS, while in others, such as Germany, differences remain despite convergence efforts. 
                                                          
26  See, for example, Sellhorn and Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006); for an overview of EU member states‟ rules for 
the determination of corporate taxable income and the relevance of IFRS therein, see Endres et al. (2007: 
159-168). 
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The most direct effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on income taxes would be observed 
where tax rules continue to refer to publicly traded firms‟ consolidated financial statements 
after IFRS adoption. However, the influence of tax accounting on consolidated financial 
statements is limited (Gee et al., 2010), and there is currently no EU member state that man-
dates income tax calculation based on publicly traded firms‟ consolidated IFRS income. Nev-
ertheless, subtler links do exist where national tax law explicitly refers to IFRS financial 
statements. One pertinent example is the interest deduction ceiling rule (Zinsschranke) intro-
duced as part of the German Corporate Tax Reform Act of 2008 (Blaufus and Lorenz, 2009). 
This rule limits the amount of tax-deductible net interest expense to 30% of earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The reference to IFRS occurs by 
means of an escape clause: The interest deduction ceiling does not apply if the firm is part of 
a consolidated group and its leverage ratio is higher than or equal to the group‟s leverage ra-
tio. The leverage ratios are measured based on consolidated IFRS financial statements. As a 
result, the interest deduction ceiling rule may trigger incentives to manage IFRS leverage 
ratios, leading to potentially distorted operating, investing, and financing decisions. 
Taken together, the role of financial accounting in shaping the determination base for 
company taxation varies substantially between EU member states, and so does the role of 
IFRS for taxation. In any event, as taxation is usually based on single-entity accounts, no di-
rect side effects can be expected from mandatory IFRS adoption. Rather, taxation issues po-
tentially emerge where member states went beyond the mandate of the IAS Regulation and 
extended IFRS to single-entity accounts. One obvious path for future research is to explore 
the IFRS-taxation link in more detail and identify cases where IFRS adoption (or changes in 
IFRS) directly bear on taxation and, consequently, create (unintended) reporting and invest-
ment incentives. Another avenue would be to investigate circumstances where tax incentives 
have a reverse impact on consolidated IFRS accounts, potentially impairing the extent to 
which these serve their intended purpose of transparency and comparability. 
Other regulation 
Regulatory actions that hinge on accounting data occur in various industries and with dif-
ferent objectives (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). For instance, bank regulation requires banks 
to maintain minimum levels of equity in relation to total assets in order to restrict default risk 
of financial institutions and thus provide stability to the financial system. In rate-regulated 
industries (e.g., electricity utilities) regulators attempt to restrict monopoly profits to protect 
consumers‟ interests and contribute to overall economic welfare. Rate regulation is typically 
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based on accounting data, for example, through restricting reported profitability to “accept-
able” levels. Finally, accounting information is also used in the regulation of trade flows. For 
example, the United States International Trade Commission officially considers the profit-
ability of an industry as reflected in the published financial statements to determine import 
relief actions such as tariff increases or quota reductions (Jones, 1991). 
These examples demonstrate that mandatory IFRS adoption has the potential to induce un-
intended consequences if regulators pursue costly adjustments of contracts or review proc-
esses when accounting rules change. In the absence of such adjustments, firms have incen-
tives to manage IFRS financial statements opportunistically to avoid (yield) unfavourable 
(favourable) regulatory actions. For instance, IFRS currently do not provide industry-specific 
accounting guidance. Given increased demand for such guidance, however, the IASB‟s (cur-
rently paused) project on “Rate-Regulated Activities” could affect rate regulation in IFRS-
adopting jurisdictions, triggering costly revision processes. This expectation is illustrated by 
the recent proposal issued by the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) to grant 
regulated entities an option to postpone mandatory IFRS adoption from 2011 to 2013 (AcSB, 
2010). Similar concerns also exist in the US where the introduction of IFRS is currently con-
templated (e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). 
With respect to financial-sector regulation, a report by the Committee of European Bank-
ing Supervisors (CEBS, 2007) documents material impacts of the transition from domestic 
GAAP to IFRS on banks‟ equity capital, mostly related to first-time application effects (per-
taining, for example, to IAS 19 on employee benefits or to IAS 40 on investment property 
assets). These effects, in turn, had to be addressed at the banking supervision level via spe-
cific adjustments to regulatory capital. Such IFRS-related adjustments to banks‟ reported eq-
uity, notably with respect to financial instruments (in particular to equity securities catego-
rized as available-for-sale), continue to be of high significance for the calculation of regula-
tory capital. Whereas these adjustments are harmonized at the European level by concurrent 
CEBS guidance, they are supplemented by varying adjustments at the country level (CEBS, 
2007). Bushman and Landsman (2010) provide a specific example from Spain where manda-
tory IFRS adoption may have resulted in unintended effects on regulatory capital require-
ments for banks. Spanish banks were forced to switch from dynamic provisioning mandated 
by domestic GAAP to an incurred loan-loss provisioning model prescribed by IAS 39. 
Bushman and Landsman (2010: 25-6) point out that “to the extent that Spanish banks‟ 
movement away from a dynamic provisioning model affects their ability to assess their own 
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capital needs, Spanish bank regulators cannot rely as heavily on the bank‟s internal risk as-
sessment and therefore have to expend more resources to make their own assessment of each 
member bank‟s risk profile” (see also Barth and Landsman, 2010: 17-18). Similar scenarios 
in other countries and/or industries are conceivable. However, we are not aware of any re-
search evidence that empirically documents the interrelation between mandatory IFRS adop-
tion and regulatory actions. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we discuss extant empirical literature and provide suggestions for future re-
search on the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU. Our analysis 
yields two main findings. First, there is conflicting evidence on whether the stated objectives 
of the IAS Regulation have been achieved. On the one hand, empirical research on these in-
tended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption generally fails to find an increase in the 
comparability or transparency of financial statements. On the other hand, there is plenty and 
almost unanimous evidence of positive effects in capital markets and at the macroeconomic 
level. We argue that certain research design issues are likely to contribute to this apparent 
mismatch, and we provide guidance for future research on how to reconcile these conflicting 
results. The second main finding is that there is very little evidence on economic conse-
quences unrelated to the stated regulatory objectives. These unintended consequences of 
mandatory IFRS adoption are potentially material given that the supranational character of 
the IAS Regulation trades off community-wide goals with the diverse objectives of member 
states. We provide specific advice for future research interested in these effects. 
Our study thus contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, we review 
and critique new evidence on the intended and unintended consequences of mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Second, we provide specific suggestions for improvement of applied research de-
signs in order to enhance inferences from these findings. Third, we identify unintended con-
sequences, or „side effects‟, of mandatory IFRS adoption as a fruitful area for future inquiry. 
Finally, we provide a potential basis for an ex-post assessment of the extent to which the ob-
jectives of the IAS Regulation have been met.  
While the literature on mandatory IFRS adoption has developed rapidly over the past five 
years, it still is relatively immature, which implies several caveats. First, many of the studies 
reviewed here represent unpublished work. It is an open question to what extent these papers 
will end up making substantial contributions to the literature. Second, most of these papers 
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rely on short time series. At least some of the documented economic consequences are likely 
to change as preparers, users and auditors of financial statements move up the learning curve. 
Third, during the first few years under IFRS, accounting numbers are likely to be tainted by 
the effect of IFRS 1 (First-time adoption of IFRS). While IFRS 1 generally requires firms to 
apply IFRS retrospectively (i.e., as if they had always been doing so), it provides for several 
mandatory exceptions and voluntary exemptions from this principle. As a result, the transi-
tion to IFRS represents a structural break in the time series of firms‟ accounting numbers that 
will take several years to wash out. Fourth, whether this paper provides an appropriate basis 
for assessing the effectiveness of the IAS Regulation depends on the extent to which regula-
tors view the measures used in the summarized literature as consistent with their objectives.  
While these caveats urge caution in interpreting extant evidence, we believe that this is the 
appropriate time to evaluate what we know and, more importantly, what we do not know 
about the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. We will consider ourselves 
successful if this paper will stimulate further research to complement our knowledge about 
the costs and benefits of implementing IFRS as the global financial reporting language.  
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 TABLE 1 
 Empirical evidence on financial reporting effects 
 
Panel A: Compliance and accounting choice studies
mandatory 273
voluntary 84
0 0
mandatory 223
voluntary 0
0 0
mandatory ~215
voluntary ~15
0 0
Substantial variation in IFRS policy choices across 
countries; variation is determined by pre-IFRS national 
reporting practices
Consistent with IAS 
Regulation objectives?
Fiscal
year(s)
Outcome variables
Glaum et al.  (2010)
Verriest et al.  (2011)
Kvaal and Nobes (2010)
IFRS
No adoption
IFRS
No adoption
17
2005 Compliance with IFRS 
disclosure requirements
2005
2005
15
5
Sample details
Adoption type
IFRS
No adoption
Study
Main findings
# Firms # Countries
Substantial non-compliance;
country- and firm-level incentives determine degree of 
non-compliance
No
No
No
Compliance with IFRS 
disclosure requirements
Substantial non-compliance;
firms with strong corporate governance are more likely to 
comply
IFRS policy choices
Summary
Panel B: Accounting properties studies
Average Cross-sectional variation
mandatory 1,631
voluntary 0
1,631 15
mandatory ~2,000
voluntary 0
~5,000 8
mandatory 1,408
voluntary 0
0 0
(continued)
No
Sample details
Adoption type
No
No adoption
Callao and Jarne (2010) IFRS
11
2003 - 2006 Earnings transparency
(discretionary accruals)
Decrease
NoAtwood et al . (2011) IFRS 2002 - 2008
25
No adoption
Earnings transparency
(earnings persistence,
relation current earnings
to future cash flows)
None Not tested.
Effect is stronger for firms from 
countries with strong legal enforcement.
Decrease
No systematic variation across countries.
Ahmed et al.  (2012) IFRS
20
2002 - 2007 Earnings transparency
(earnings smoothing,
earnings targeting,
conditional conservatism)
No adoption
Study
Main findings
# Firms # Countries
Fiscal
year(s)
Outcome variables
IFRS effect Consistent with IAS 
Regulation objectives?
 TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
 
This table summarizes selected empirical evidence on the financial reporting effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. Panel A focuses on compliance and accounting choice studies. 
Panel B is dedicated to studies that analyze the properties of accounting numbers. Panel C reviews value relevance studies. For each study, the table presents details on the sample, 
lists the key outcome variables, describes the main findings and indicates whether these findings are consistent with the objectives of the IAS Regulation. The tilde (~) denotes 
estimated sample sizes when the precise number of sample firms was not retrievable from the respective study. In Panel A, we define that the main findings of substantial non-
compliance and variation of accounting policy choices are not consistent with the objectives of the IAS Regulation. In Panels B and C, we define the findings of a study (not) to be 
consistent with the IAS Regulation objectives if they imply that earnings transparency, earnings comparability or value relevance increases (decreases or is unaffected) on average. 
If the IFRS effect is confined to a subset of firms we define the results to be contingently consistent with the IAS Regulation objectives.               
mandatory 2,155
voluntary 0
7,693 15
mandatory 1,317
voluntary 0
1,395 20No adoption
Cascino and Gassen (2011) IFRS
14
2001 - 2008 Earnings comparability None Effect is confined to firms with strong 
compliance incentives.
Yes
(contingent)
No adoption
Lang et al.  (2010) IFRS
26
2001 - 2008 Earnings comparability:
Earnings comovement:
NoDecrease
Increase
Not tested.
Panel C: Value relevance studies
Average Cross-sectional variation
mandatory 2,298
voluntary 0
0 0
mandatory 1,203
voluntary 0
0 0
mandatory 155
voluntary 0
279 1
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voluntary ~100
0 0
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No adoption
Wu and Zhang (2009b) IFRS
25
1990 - 2007 Sensitivity of credit ratings
to accounting information
No adoption
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No adoption
None Effect is confined to voluntary adoptions 
and mandatory adoptions in countries 
with strong legal enforcement.
Increase Effect is stronger for firms in countries 
with larger differences in local GAAP 
relative to IFRS.
Increase Effect differs between financial and
non-financial firms and across country 
groups.
YesBarth et al.  (2011) IFRS
15
2004 Equity value relevance of 
differences between local 
GAAP net income and 
restated IFRS net income
Aharony et al.  (2010) IFRS
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2003 - 2005 Equity value relevance of 
goodwill, R&D expenses 
and revaluation of PPE
Study
Sample details Main findings
Adoption type # Firms # Countries
Fiscal
year(s)
Outcome variables
Consistent with IAS 
Regulation objectives?
IFRS effect
Bhat et al.  (2011) IFRS
17
2003 - 2008 Sensitivity of CDS spreads
to accounting information
None No systematic variation across countries. No
No adoption
 TABLE 2 
 Empirical evidence on capital-market effects 
 
 
Panel A: Direct evidence
Average Cross-sectional variation
mandatory ~3,100
voluntary ~650
~17,500 25
mandatory ~1,000
voluntary ~80
0 0
mandatory 1,365
voluntary 0
7,630 10
mandatory 1,693
voluntary 132
3,812 11
mandatory ~2,200
voluntary ~500
~7,000 21
mandatory ~379
voluntary ~187
~3,613 20
mandatory ~700
voluntary 0
0 0
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(contingent)
Yes
(contingent)
Equity investments by 
international institutional 
investors
Yes
Cross-border equity 
investments by international 
mutual funds 
Effect is confined to firms from countries 
with strong legal enforcement and with 
larger differences between local GAAP 
and IFRS.
Increase
Increase
DeFond et al.  (2011) IFRS
14
Brüggemann et al. (2011)
Florou and Pope (2011) 2003 - 2006
No adoption
No adoption
2003 - 2007
(w/o 2005)
IFRS
20
2001 - 2007
Decrease Effect is confined to firms from countries 
with strong legal enforcement 
No adoption
IFRS
24
Cross-border equity 
investments by German 
individual investors
Effect is not associated with country 
institutions such as the strength of legal 
enforcement.
No adoption
Yes
(contingent)
Increase
Effect is confined to firms from countries 
with strong implementation credibility 
that experience relatively large increases 
in accounting standards uniformity.
YesIncrease Effect is stronger for small firms from 
insider economies.
Yes
(contingent)
Increase
Decrease
Effects are confined to firms that seek 
public bond financing in foreign 
countries with strong legal enforcement.
S. Li (2010) IFRS
18
1995 - 2006 Cost of equity capital
No adoption
Florou and Kosi (2011) IFRS
23
1999 - 2008 Public bond issues:
Bond yield spreads:
No adoption
Schleicher et al.  (2010) IFRS
6
2000 - 2007 Firm-level capital
investment efficiency
Consistent with IAS 
Regulation objectives?
Daske et al.  (2008) IFRS
26
2001 - 2005 Stock market liquidity:
Cost of equity capital:
Tobin's Q:
Yes
(contingent)
Study
Sample details Main findings
Adoption type # Firms # Countries
Fiscal
year(s)
Outcome variables
IFRS effect
No adoption
Increase
Mixed
Mixed
Positive effects are confined to firms 
from countries with strong legal 
enforcement and institutions that provide 
strong reporting incentives.
 TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
This table summarizes selected empirical evidence on the capital-market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. Panel A focuses on studies that directly analyze economic conse-
quences in capital markets. Panel B is dedicated to studies that provide indirect evidence by examining capital-market perceptions of the quality of financial statement information. 
For each study, the table presents details on the sample, lists the key outcome variables, describes the main findings and indicates whether these findings are consistent with the 
objectives of the IAS Regulation. The tilde (~) denotes estimated sample sizes when the precise number of sample firms was not retrievable from the respective study. We define 
the findings of a study to be consistent with the IAS Regulation objectives if they imply that capital-market benefits materialize on average. If the IFRS effect is confined to a 
subset of firms we define the results to be contingently consistent with the IAS Regulation objectives, regardless of the sign of the average IFRS effect. 
Panel B: Indirect evidence
Average Cross-sectional variation
mandatory ~2,000
voluntary 0
~4,000 11
mandatory 760
voluntary 199
0 0
mandatory 1,904
voluntary 0
0 0
mandatory 1,168
voluntary 250
0 0
mandatory 2,235
voluntary 635
5,254 21
mandatory 2,679
voluntary 601
0 0
Tan et al.  (2011) IFRS
25
Yes
No adoption
No adoption
No adoption
Beuselinck et al.  (2010) IFRS
14
2003 - 2007 Stock return synchronicity Decrease at 
adoption, 
then increase
Effect is stronger for firms in countries 
with larger differences in local GAAP 
relative to IFRS.
None Effect is confined to announcer-
nonannouncer pairs where both firms are 
from countries with strong legal 
enforcement.
Horton et al. (2011)
Kim and Li (2011) IFRS
20
2002 - 2008
(w/o 2005)
Cross-border information 
transfers from earnings 
announcements
No adoption
YesIncrease Effect is stronger for firms from 
countries with larger differences 
between local GAAP and IFRS.
2001 - 2007 Quality of foreign analysts' 
information environment
No adoption
Byard et al.  (2011) IFRS
20
2003 - 2006
Landsman et al.  (2011)
Study Consistent with IAS 
Regulation objectives?
IFRS
16
2002 - 2007 Information content of 
earnings announcements
Yes
No adoption
Sample details Main findings
Adoption type # Firms # Countries
Fiscal
year(s)
Outcome variables
IFRS effect
Increase Effect is stronger for firms from 
countries with strong legal enforcement.
Yes
(contingent)
Quality of analysts' 
information environment
Yes
None Effect is confined to firms from countries 
with strong legal enforcement and with 
larger differences between local GAAP 
and IFRS.
Yes
(contingent)
IFRS
25
2001 - 2007 Quality of analysts' 
information environment
Increase Effect is stronger for firms with larger 
differences between pre-adoption 
accounting treatments and IFRS.
 TABLE 3 
 Empirical evidence on macroeconomic effects 
 
This table summarizes selected empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. For each study, the table presents details on the sample, lists the 
key outcome variables, describes the main findings and indicates whether these findings are consistent with the objectives of the IAS Regulation. We define the findings of a study 
(not) to be consistent with the IAS Regulation objectives if they imply that macroeconomic benefits exist (do not exist) on average.  
Average Cross-sectional variation
mandatory -
voluntary -
- 45
mandatory -
voluntary -
- 12
mandatory -
voluntary -
- 7
mandatory -
voluntary -
- 8
Increase Effect is stronger in countries with lower 
pre-adoption IFRS conformity or if 
partner countries have different 
accounting traditions.
IFRS effect
Increase Effect is stronger in countries with low 
corruption and strong investor protection 
or if investor country also uses IFRS.
None
Increase
Only non-adopting countries increase 
debt investment into adopting countries.
Yes
No adoption
Márquez-Ramos (2011) IFRS
27
2002 - 2007 Foreign direct investment:
Trade in goods:
Yes
No
No adoption
Chen et al.  (2011) IFRS
23
2000 - 2005 Foreign direct investment
Increase
None
Foreign direct investment effect is 
stronger in countries with medium and 
high uncertainty aversion.
Yes
No adoption
Beneish et al.  (2010) IFRS
17
2003 - 2007 Foreign equity investment:
Foreign debt investment:
No
Yes
Amiram (2009) IFRS
60
1997,
2001 - 2006
Foreign equity investment
No adoption
Study
Sample details Main findings
Adoption type # Firms # Countries
Fiscal
year(s)
Outcome variables
Consistent with IAS 
Regulation objectives?
 TABLE 4 
 Sample size comparison 
 
This table compares the number of IFRS adopters in the 27 EU countries as identified by the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) with the sample sizes of five academic studies. CESR (2007) reports the number of 
equity issuers that were admitted to trading on a regulated market and prepared a consolidated IFRS account in fiscal 
year 2005. These numbers are based on information provided by national enforcement institutions across Europe. 
Daske et al. (2008) consider all companies during fiscal years 2001–2005 “that have sufficient financial data from 
Worldscope and price/volume data from Datastream to estimate (…) Model 3 for Zero Returns” (see their table 1). 
The sample of mandatory IFRS adopters in Daske et al. (2008) is confined to firms with fiscal year end in December 
2005. The number of voluntary IFRS adopters analyzed by Daske et al. (2008) is not directly retrievable from their 
tables and therefore not considered here. DeFond et al. (2011) analyze mandatory IFRS adopters that are covered in 
the TFS international mutual fund database and have sufficient data in Compustat Global (stock performance, ac-
counting standards followed) and IBES (analyst following) for fiscal years 2003-2004 and 2006-2007. Countries with 
few public firms are excluded from their sample. Landsman et al. (2011) focus on mandatory IFRS adopters and 
require IBES earnings announcement dates as well as returns and volume data from Datastream to be available. They 
also impose size (Total Assets > US$ 100MM) and liquidity restrictions (proportion of zero return days < 80%) and 
delete countries with less than 150 firm-years. In this table, we present the composition of their sample for fiscal year 
2005. Byard et al. (2011) select all voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters covered in IBES that have data both 
before and after IFRS adoption (sample period: fiscal years 2003-2006).  
Country
Year of EU
accession
CESR
(2007)
Daske
et al.
(2008)
DeFond 
et al.
(2011)
Landsman 
et al. 
(2011)
Byard
et al.
(2011)
Austria 1995 72 17 9 0 16
Belgium 1957 144 56 31 41 46
Denmark 1973 140 62 39 45 43
Finland 1995 135 99 74 53 57
France 1957 680 370 251 205 197
Germany 1957 768 216 89 73 120
Greece 1981 356 150 48 58 37
Ireland 1973 43 36 21 0 24
Italy 1957 288 79 159 43 96
Luxembourg 1957 35 13 0 0 5
Netherlands 1957 165 129 69 77 54
Portugal 1986 50 37 21 0 14
Spain 1986 190 91 48 75 69
Sweden 1995 350 168 155 93 71
United Kingdom 1973 953 418 351 516 400
Bulgaria 2007 369 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 2004 141 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 2004 66 5 0 0 3
Estonia 2004 16 0 0 0 0
Hungary 2004 34 3 0 0 8
Latvia 2004 13 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 2004 43 0 0 0 0
Malta 2004 15 0 0 0 0
Poland 2004 197 55 0 0 11
Romania 2007 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 2004 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 2004 60 0 0 0 0
1957-1995 4,369 1,941 1,365 1,279 1,249
2004-2007 954 63 0 0 22
1957-2007 5,323 2,004 1,365 1,279 1,271
Total
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